Abstract-This paper focuses on several important topics related to subgraph anomaly detection for computer networks. First, we briefly discuss a graph based view of a computer network consisting of nodes (computers) and edges (time-series of communications between computers), and how stochastic models of groups of edges can be used to identify local anomalous areas of the network indicating the traversal of attackers. Next, the concept of a new edge, an edge between two computers that have never communicated before, is introduced, and a model for establishing the probability of such an event is provided. We follow this with a discussion of exponentially weighted moving averages for updating models of edges. Next, as measuring network data for the purposes of anomaly detection is difficult we discuss a host agent designed specifically to gather this type of data. Finally, the performance of anomaly detection using this host agent to collect data is compared with that of DNS data.
I. INTRODUCTION
We approach the problem of detecting the movement of attackers within computer networks. We define attackers as either malicious insiders or external actors who have penetrated perimeter defenses, similar in spirit to the stepping stone literature [1] , [2] . Unlike that work, however, we take a model-based approach based upon measuring the deviation from baseline activity models. Additionally, we ask the statistical question not about individual hosts, but about subgraphs of communicating hosts. This work is a direct follow-on to the subgraph anomaly detection approach first introduced in [3] , [4] , a brief summary of which is given in Section II. In this work, we propose three innovations.
First, communications between computers (edges) which have not communicated in the past (new edges) can provide a strong statistical signal for detecting attackers, for example in a Pass the Hash scenario [5] . As they move laterally through a network, attackers tend to violate the historic connectivity patterns in the network. Knowledge of these patterns is perhaps the primary advantage defenders have over attackers. Therefore, in Section II-A we introduce a model for establishing the probability of an observed new edge.
Second, since network behavior changes constantly, an online system requires the continuous updating of models, and the choice of updating scheme affects false and true alarm rates. Therefore, in Section II-B we introduce an updating scheme based on asymmetric exponentially weighted moving averages (AEWMAs) to handle continuous updating of the parameters of models in a way that balances acceptable false alarm rates with rapid updating to adjust for changes in baseline behavior.
Connectivity information is required for network anomaly detection. One common data source is NetFlow [6] . A less common source of connectivity information is Domain Name Service (DNS) data where we infer a directed connection between nodes A and B when A looks up B. This can be an easier data source to collect than NetFlow on large networks with fewer DNS servers than routers. In addition to these sources of network data, we propose that an important source for the purposes of identifying local attack behavior is the hosts themselves. To this end, we have implemented a host agent and we show in Section III that host agent data is a necessary addition to that of NetFlow and DNS views of network data for the purposes of anomaly detection.
A. Previous Work
In general, statistical anomaly detection on streaming data has become an important area of research given the proliferation of data over the past few decades, and the need to detect quickly the event that a process has changed significantly from past behavior. Applications can be found in many areas including engineering [7] , computer science [8] , and, specifically, in communications networks [7] , [9] - [11] .
In many cases, the data can be represented as a graph [12] . Nodes represent actors sending and receiving data, and edges represent communications between nodes. Anomalies can be detected in the changes to the structure of the graph [13] , [14] .
Examining local areas of communications graphs was established in [15] , which inspects all edges emanating from each host. Similar methods that aggregate at the node, examining each node's behavior independently, include [9] , [11] . In none of this work are individual edges modeled. Yet different edges may have significantly different behavior over time, and attacks between nodes must happen over the edges between them. The movement of attackers across nodes cannot be captured by analyzing node behavior separately for each node. In these cases, modeling each edge is desirable. Additionally, all of these graph methods tend to lack fine-grained locality, which we address by using 3-paths, as discussed in Section II.
In only one article identified, [16] , are the individual edges modeled. A Bayesian testing framework is proposed to test the anomalousness of each edge in a social network, without consideration of other local edge anomalousness. These edges are then passed to a secondary analysis that examines the graph constructed from the edges that were detected in the initial pass. Interesting features of the anomalous edge graph can be detected in this way, but simultaneously testing multiple local sets of edges will have increased power to detect locally anomalous behavior. For example, if two anomalous edges were connected by a non-anomalous edge, this possible traversal path would likely be missed by the technique in [16] , but is a valid anomaly in many settings. In addition, when data speeds are high, a fully Bayesian treatment may pose computational difficulties, unless the model is parsimonious enough for sequential Monte Carlo [17] .
The subject of new edges is related to link prediction in the social network literature [18] , where suggesting "friends" is an important topic. In this work, however, we ask about the tail of the probability distribution. Instead of finding most probable new "friends", we seek the most unlikely new edges between pairs of computers, in order to identify anomalies.
EWMAs are used in a wide variety of computer security applications [19] - [21] . The work perhaps most relevant for this work is that of [10] , whose focus is the monitoring of a large telephone network for degradation in network performance. The massive scale of that work is similar to what we encounter in large computer networks, and their choice of EWMAs for fast updating was inspirational to this work.
Examples of related work in host agent data collection include commercial products such as Guidance Software's EnCase [22] and the open-source Snare [23] agent. EnCase has a powerful set of digital forensics capabilities that are typically used for data gathering after evidence of a cyber attack is detected, whereas our proposed host agent constantly uploads data for anomaly detection purposes. Snare is a multi-platform event and system log collection tool that is very good at relaying data from a host to a central server; however, it has no capabilities for generating data on its own. Furthermore, open-source Snare does not encrypt event data in transit, although the closed-source enterprise version has this feature. To enable our work in anomaly detection, an agent must both collect system event data and have a capability for generating new event data from observed behavior on the host. As we are targeting mobile devices including laptops, tablets and smart phones for data collection, having encrypted transmission of event data is a requirement. This gap in existing solutions has led us to develop our own agent technology, which is described in Section III.
II. TRAVERSAL ANOMALY DETECTION
We target the detection of attackers who make multiple hops through a network. Many of the details of this methodology can be found in [3] , [4] , which will be referred to as PathScan for the remainder of this paper. We briefly review the approach here.
The basic idea is to examine deviation from historic behavior, in a window of time. The key innovation in PathScan is to test the deviation at the level of subgraphs of interconnected nodes, rather than on each individual host or pair of communicating hosts. One subgraph identified, which has been effective in identifying the traversal of an attacker through a network, is the k-path. Attackers on networks naturally form k-paths as they move laterally from system to system as an attack evolves over time. These subgraphs are most likely new, or statistically unlikely, making these structures ideal for anomaly detection. A 3-path is given in Figure 1 . In this work, we focus exclusively on the 3-path, although other values of k, and other shapes altogether, can be used.
We test for statistical deviation from a historic model of the sequence of communications on each edge in the path, and every path that exists in the overall network is enumerated and tested. In order to scale to large networks, we must avoid building statistical models for each path (of which there may be billions or trillions), instead relying on statistical independence between edges connected in a path to construct a model for each path from models on each edge in the path. See [3] , [4] for details on the construction of path models from edge models, and for a study of the validity of this independence assumption.
Models for the behavior of communications between pairs of computers can be complicated. For the purposes of this paper, we will focus on simple Bernoulli models. Specifically, in a 30 minute window, we estimate the probability that the edge in question appears at all, ignoring how much or what type of activity is observed on that edge.
A. New Edges
The approach described above discusses the stochastic modeling of existing edges, and seeks paths upon which the data have deviated from baseline models. Through examination of historic attacks, however, it is clear that new edges -those edges between a pair of communicating computers that have never communicated before -can be indicative of attacks.
For existing edges, one can associate a model with the observed behavior, and then estimate the parameters of the model given observed behavior. A more complicated problem is to estimate the probability of observing a new edge, since we have no existing behavior upon which to base our estimation. Instead, we borrow information from the frequency at which the source and destination nodes make and receive new edges from other nodes in the network.
Specifically, suppose that we observe source node x initiating a new edge to destination node y. To establish a probability of observing this edge, we propose a logistic model:
logit (P xy ) = α + β x + γ y where P xy is the probability of the new edge initiated by x, bound for y, α is an effect for the overall rate at which new edges are produced in the network, β x is an effect for how often x initiates new edges, and γ y is an effect for how often y receives new edges. Maximum likelihood estimation of the above model is O(N 2 ), where N is the number of nodes in the network, and no trivially parallel algorithm exists. Instead, we use method of moments estimation [24] , significantly reducing estimation complexity. On large networks, method of moments provides high quality estimation, since the sample size will be very large. In addition, estimation only provides initial estimates, which are then updated, as described in Section II-B, quickly minimizing the effects of initial estimation error.
PathScan has been implemented operationally on Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL's) networks, and has identified several Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks using the new edge model discussed above, but the sensitivity of these findings prevents a discussion here.
B. AEWMAs for Updating
Next, we seek a method for updating the model parameters for each edge in near real time, for a large network.
The operational system at LANL maintains roughly 1.5 million unique edge models, and updating them needs to be lightweight. In addition, we seek a method that controls alarm rates, so that an anomalous behavior, such as new edges appearing, should rapidly become expected, to avoid inundating security analysts with alarms. Therefore, we suggest an AEWMA for this task.
Again, assume we are estimating a simple Bernoulli model on each edge. That is, for edge E, we have an estimate p = P (E exists) in the time window t under question, and we observe X t = 0 if E does not exist in window t, while X t = 1 if it does exist. Our AEWMA updated estimate is given by
where λ 1 is the AEWMA weight controlling the rate at which the probability increases, and λ 2 controls the rate at which the probability decreases. The AEWMA parameters λ 1 and λ 2 can be selected according to effective sample size [25] , using the rule of thumb equation λ = 2 N +1 where N is the number of effective windows. The affect of samples decays exponentially back in time so that all previous time contributes to the AEWMA, but the effective size is the number of previous windows that contribute substantially. λ 1 controls the rate at which the parameter increases over time if the edge is observed, while λ 2 controls the rate of decrease in the parameter, when the edge is not observed. For example, λ 1 can be set so that, on average, an edge that is highly anomalous will remain so for ten minutes, say, and λ 2 can be set so that non-anomalous edges become anomalous if the edge has not been seen for several weeks or months. In this way, anomalies quickly become learned, avoiding many successive alarms, and edges take much longer to become anomalous again, also controlling alarm rates.
Note that since the new edge parameter is also a probability of existence, the same formula can be used to update new edge parameters. More complicated models, such as Markov or Hidden Markov models, require more sophisticated updating, a topic for future work.
III. UNIFIED HOST COLLECTION AGENT
A weakness of most data collection infrastructures is limited visibility between internal nodes within the network. To improve the detection of attackers, end point visibility must be enhanced. Comprehensive end point visibility necessitates deploying software at the network host level. Not all network switches are capable of collecting network flow data at the subnet level. Likewise, DNS data viability suffers from caching and requires that adversaries use host names, as opposed to IP addresses, when establishing connections to target nodes.
To improve end point visibility we have developed a crossplatform software agent that runs on Windows, Mac OS X, Linux and Android. The Unified Host Collection Agent (UHCA) is written in Python, making it easy to adapt and extend to our various target operating systems. The agent's primary purpose is data collection and it is designed to have minimal impact on the host operating system. Testing has shown that the agent uses only 2-8% of a single CPU core.
The agent collects system state and events and encodes them as JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) records called JSON Encoded Logs (JELs). All JELs contain a generation time stamp, agent ID (currently the MAC address), agent IP address, operating system type and record type (in this case network connection state).
JELs are forwarded in encrypted UDP packets to one or more central collection servers at frequent (1-5 minute) intervals. Multiple servers can be specified in the agent configuration file allowing the system to scale horizontally. Collection capabilities of the agent include process stop and start information with checksums of starting process images, network connection event logs (generated with Bro [26] ), mapping of running processes to established network connections and current network connection state.
For the purpose of this paper we focus only on the network connection state polling capabilities of the agent. Although not an ideal approach for many applications [27] , in our case it is adequate for detecting anomalous edges in network graphs, as shown in Section IV-A.
A. Network State Polling
To detect anomalous paths, PathScan takes a list of triples (time, source IP address, destination IP address) of values indicating network communication between hosts. Extending PathScan to leverage UHCA data requires the agent to report uniform host network communication information across all its target platforms. On Linux, procfs (specifically /proc/tcp and /proc/udp) is used to generate this data. The prototype OS X and Android implementations parse the output of a call to netstat, although we realize that is is not an optimal approach. The Windows agent uses the Python ctypes Windows IP helper module's GetExtendedTcpTable method (ctypes.windll.iphlpapi.GetExtendedTcpTable), which provides network state information similar to procfs and netstat.
In each implementation, data is polled every second. The drawback of this polling approach is that short-lived (subsecond) connections will be missed by the agent. This may be an issue for many detection techniques, but the focus of PathScan is to detect attackers traversing a network in an interactive manner. Even automated traversals would need greater than one second resolution to maintain state on target nodes. To address the issue of short-lived connections being missed, we are investigating using the TCP time wait state. In post-processing we can test to see if there were entries in time wait states that did not have corresponding established connection entries. Any such connections can be reported as short-lived connections.
Although PathScan only requires a list of triples, UHCA sends as much detail as possible about the network connection state back to the collection server to provide additional information for other applications. Data is post-processed into PathScan triples using scripts for low-volume test data or map reduce for larger jobs.
Other fields in the network connection JELs include source and destination port, state of the connection (established, listening, time wait, etc.), process ID associated with the connection (not yet provided on OS X) and counts of the number of seconds the connection was active within a one minute time window. Future versions of PathScan will likely leverage the port information to better distinguish individual communications and the count information to establish edge weights.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
To test our hypothesis that the use of host-collected network data will improve PathScan's detection capabilities, edge detection rates were directly compared between two versions of PathScan, one using DNS (Path-DNS) to generate edge lists and a second using host agent network data (Path-UHCA) to generate edge lists. For this study, subnetlevel flow data was not available, yet we believe it to be a valuable data source. The same model parameters were used in both configurations, although it is likely that parameter tuning could be used to improve results in both cases. We reserve this analysis for future work.
To begin the experiment, agents were deployed on 30 operational hosts on LANL's internal network. The hosts used were a mix of various Linux servers and desktops and two Mac OS X desktops spanning two subnets. Training data was collected for a 7-day period and then analyzed to identify new 3-paths within the test network using the new edge models discussed in Section II-A.
Analysis of the training data resulted in the selection of five new, unique paths containing between four and seven edges each, where every edge was a new edge in the training data. A total of 17 unique hosts were involved in the paths selected for testing. The network connectivity graph for these 17 hosts from the training data, with IP addresses omitted, is shown in Figure 2 .
For the purposes of the following discussion, we denote a name-edge as an edge which triggers a DNS query, and an IP-edge as one that did not.
In the experiments, we generate paths with a mixture of name-edges and IP-edges. The purpose of this was to create a mix of paths, and sub-paths, that can and cannot be detected by Path-DNS, but can be identified by Path-UHCA. Intuitively, Path-DNS should not see any IP-edges. There will be no record of the communication in DNS as their was no host name provided to look up. The host agent should see both types of connections and therefore Path-UHCA should be able to detect all of our test paths. Our results, as shown below, support this hypothesis.
Next, we generated the test paths in the data using secure shell (SSH) connections between hosts. SSH was chosen as it was trivial to configure given the test environment and made it very easy to replicate the traversal behavior commonly seen in incidents involving compromised hosts within a network. Each path was active between 3 and 5 minutes and all were executed within a 45 minute window.
A. Results
Following generation of the test paths we ran Path-DNS and Path-UHCA on the test data. The test paths comprised 30 total edges. Path-DNS detected 14 out of 30 edges (46.6%) while Path-UHCA detected 27 of 30 edges (90.0%). The paths consisted of half name-edges half IP-edges, giving Path-DNS a maximum theoretical detection rate of 50% and Path-UHCA a maximum theoretical detection rate of 100%. Both systems came up short of these rates for reasons that are discussed below.
The figures below show sub-paths of 4 of the 5 test paths generated in our experiment. For consistency of presentation we display the first four edges from each path, even though some paths contain more edges. In all cases where edges are omitted, if the approach detected the last edge shown, then it continued to detect the remaining edges. If the approach failed to detect the last edge, then it continued to miss all remaining edges.
In the figures, nodes (network hosts) are circles and edges (network communications) are shown with either a line with a diamond end point (name-edge) or an arrow (IP-edge) pointing to the destination node. Bars labeled DNS and UHCA are used to indicate the detection length of each approach. Longer bars indicate longer detected paths. Short or missing bars highlight where the two approaches failed to detect edges in a path. Figure 3 . Path generated using name-edges. Both approaches detect the anomalous path but Path-UHCA misses some edges due to poor test edge selection in the test data.
The first path, shown in Figure 3 , shows the detection results for a path with six edges (a 6-path) where all edges were generated with host name look ups. As predicted, this path was detected successfully by Path-DNS. Surprisingly Path-UHCA missed the first two edges in the path, although it picked up the path after that and detected the remaining four edges.
This was an unexpected result in our experiment. After analyzing the data in detail, it was determined that one host involved in the path (the second hop) functioned as a institutional server, constantly generating a large number of new connections. This traffic was looked over during manual inspection and in hindsight was a poor choice for generating a test path.
Even so, this example justifies our use of a model versus simply detecting all new paths (paths consisting entirely of new edges) as anomalous. Since new edge behavior is modeled, PathScan expected this server to create new edges. Therefore, paths traversing through this server were deemed less anomalous, and did not exceed the alarm threshold. Without a model, all paths through this server would alarm, increasing false alarm rates. The second path, shown in Figure 4 , is a 7-path generated entirely with IP-edges. This experiment behaved exactly as anticipated: Path-UHCA detected every edge while Path-DNS did not detect any edges. Path-DNS simply cannot detect these types of paths as there is no DNS activity generated by these types of network traversals. The third path, shown in Figure 5 , is a 6-path where the first three edges were generated with name-edges while the last three edges were generated with IP-edges . Path-DNS was able to detect the first three edges as expected, but then failed to detect the IP-edges. Path-UHCA was able to detect the full path as expected.
Another variant of this path was tested as well, but results are not shown for the sake of brevity. In this 5-path, the path began with two IP-edges and then continued with three name-edges. Path-UHCA detected the entire path while Path-DNS only detected the path after it switched to nameedges. The final path, shown in Figure 6 , is a 6-path where the edges alternated between name-edges and IP-edges. Our prediction was that this path would be undetectable to Path-DNS and fully detected by Path-UHCA. Path-UHCA did in fact detect the full path but Path-DNS was able to detect the first edge of the path. Analysis of the data showed that this edge was part of an unrelated 3-path found by Path-DNS. It was coincidentally related to the edge chosen for this test path.
These initial results are encouraging as they validate our hypothesis that Path-UHCA can lead to improved attacker detection. The results also validate that Path-DNS is performing very close to our expected detection rates.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have made several advancements in the online operation of the network traversal detection method known as PathScan. We have developed a model for establishing the probability of observing an edge between two computers that have never communicated before. This model has proven valuable in the identification of APT attackers on LANL's network.
In addition, we have added a lightweight method for updating the parameters of the edge models, using AEWMAs to control the increase and decrease of parameter values separately. This method serves two purpose. First, it limits alarms presented to already overtaxed incident response personnel. Second, it enables the updating of millions of models in near real time.
Finally, we have developed a lightweight host agent capable of collecting the communications patterns needed for graph based network anomaly detection. We have shown that data collected from this agent is superior in coverage to that of DNS data feeds.
A. Future Work
There are several immediate steps to take in improving this work. First, while we show that a host agent is the most comprehensive data source, a union of DNS, NetFlow and host agent data promises to be more complete. We intend to study the gaps and overlaps between these three data sources in much more detail.
Additionally, the host agent provides us with an opportunity to measure many behaviors of individual hosts which do not produce network communications, but do promise to identify compromises. For example, the fact that new services are being instantiated, we believe, has much promise in identifying attacks. The PathScan framework can easily be modified to include anomaly levels emanating from individual hosts, as well as the edges between hosts. A host agent is the only viable means of collection this type of data.
Host agents also allow us to distribute the anomaly detection analysis to the hosts themselves, rather than to a central analysis machine. This eliminates the single source of failure, and reduces the amount of network traffic bound for the central analysis machine. Data can be shared among local groups of hosts, and anomaly detection decisions can be made on each host. In addition there is the potential to dynamically disallow communications from suspect hosts.
Another interesting line of inquiry is to make the amount of data collected at each host a function of the anomaly levels being detected on that host. For example, at low anomaly levels, only basic connectivity information can be collected. At moderate levels, process accounting information and full NetFlow style records can be collected. Finally, at a very high level of anomaly, full packet capture along with full host information can be collected. While this cannot be done on the entire network, it can be done in local areas, as driven by localized anomaly detection.
